We advance two objections to the selfish gene theory formulated by Richard Dawkins, which states that natural selection operates on genetic replicators. These objections target three of the essential features of the theory. The first feature is the exclusivity that the theory ascribes to genetic replicators as objects of natural selection. We call it “the exclusivity clause”. The second and third features correspond to two criteria that genetic replicators must satisfy for Dawkins’ theory to hold. We call them “the stability (...) criterion” and “the fidelity criterion”. The first objection we advance is that, given the findings of transgenerational epigenetics, genetic replicators do not appear to satisfy the exclusivity clause and some of them do not seem to meet the stability criterion. The second objection is that the existence of the molecular phenomena known as alternative splicing and trans-splicing seems to entail that many genetic replicators do not satisfy neither the stability criterion nor the fidelity criterion. (shrink)

Nos ocupamos de la controversia científica sobre la plausibilidad del seleccionismo génico. En primer lugar, mostramos que esta controversia parece estar estancada en su conjunto y particularmente sobre la cuestión central: si los genes son el objeto de la selección natural. En segundo lugar, sostenemos que el estancamiento sobre esta cuestión se explica en buena medida porque las partes en disputa están posicionadas sobre modos distintos de comprender la genética. Finalmente, argumentamos que la controversia podría avanzar si se enfrentara un (...) asunto muy problemático que, a pesar de su relevancia, ha sido relegado a un segundo plano: cómo definir “gen” en términos moleculares. (shrink)